Citizenship, democracy and social justice: A conversation with Maria Olson by Peters, Michael A.
 112 
 
  Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice 
   Volume 5(1), 2013, pp. 112–120, ISSN 1948-9137 
 
CITIZENSHIP, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE:  
A CONVERSATION WITH MARIA OLSON 
 
MICHAEL A. PETERS 
m.peters@waikato.ac.nz 
University of Waikato 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
 
 
 
Maria Olson is a researcher and lecturer in Education at Stockholm University and 
the University of Skövde, Sweden. 
Her areas of interest include democracy and citizenship in relation to education. 
Her major fields are educational theory and educational philosophy. Her current pub- 
lications include most recently a series of papers that develop themes of citizenship, 
democracy and social justice, including: “Citizenship Education without Citizenship? 
The Migrant in EU Policy on Participatory Citizenship – Toward the Margin through 
‘Strangification,’” in R. Hedke and T. Zimenkova (eds.), Education for Civic and 
Political Participation: A Critical Approach (pp. 155–170). London: Routledge, 
2012; “Citizenship ‘in Between’: The Local and the Global Scope of European 
Citizenship in Swedish Educational Policy,” in S. Goncales and M. A. Carpenter 
(eds.), Intercultural Policies and Education (pp. 193–203). New York: Peter Lang, 
2012; “The European ‘We’: From Citizenship Policy to the Role of Education,” 
Studies in Philosophy and Education 31(1), 77–89, 2012; “Opening Discourses of 
Citizenship Education: Theorizing with Foucault” (with Nicoll, K., Fejes, A., 
Dahlstedt, M. & Biesta, G. J. J.), Journal of Education Policy, 2013 (forthcoming); 
“Democracy Lessons in Market-oriented Schools: The Case of Swedish Upper 
Secondary Education,” Education, Citizenship and Social Justice, online first, Doi: 
10.1177/17461979134836842013 (with Lundahl, Lisbeth), 2013; “What Counts as 
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Young People’s Civic Engagement in Times of Accountability? On the Importance 
of Maintaining Openness about Young People’s Civic Engagement in Education,” 
in M. Olson (ed.), Theme: Citizenship Education under Liberal Democracy. Ut- 
bildning & Demokrati [Education & Democracy] 21(1), 29–55, 2012.  
 
Michael Peters: Maria can you tell us something of your educational back- 
ground and upbringing in Sweden and how you became interested in the 
question of citizenship. 
 
Maria Olson: My educational background includes a Bachelor’s degree in 
psychology and philosophy at Stockholm University, and a Master’s degree 
in religious science at Uppsala University. My doctoral degree is in peda- 
gogic practices, with a minor in political science, at Linköping University, 
Sweden. I was raised in Lugnås, a small village with only 2000 inhabitants. 
Lugnås, which means ‘quite ridge’ in Swedish, is located in the mid south 
of Sweden. The area is marked out by its relatively flat landscape and 
farmland. When I was nine years old my family moved to Mariestad, a city 
nearby. Mariestad is an industrial city that basically lives of producing 
refrigerators and toilet paper. Located on the coast of Sweden’s largest lake 
its humble beauty is evident. 
As concerns the question of citizenship I find it enthralling as it often 
denotes collectively nurtured politico-ideological desires for a better world. 
These desires do not seem to be weakened by the notion that we are facing 
the present and future situation in society in a way that is riven with severe 
problems. To provide an example, we may turn to the present situation in 
Europe, where some people become expelled from the place where they 
live their lives for being considered not to embody a ‘proper’ citizenship. I 
think that this political, or betterly, governmental meagerness in present 
times calls for deepened investigation. 
Put briefly, I think that the question of citizenship is intimately related 
to the very idea of humanity, or human-ness. As education is one of the most 
critical public bodies in modern times in providing for these processes, my 
interest in citizenship is closely linked to education and its alleged and 
assigned commitments. Could you fall in here, Michael, and tell us some- 
thing about the question of citizenship and its relation to education from 
your point of view? 
 
Michael Peters: Thanks for information on your background. To evade your 
question for the moment what occurs to me is that Swedish intellectuals 
seem to feel a strong responsibility for producing conditions for a better 
world not only in conflict studies but across the board. Is this a reflection of 
Swedish cosmopolitanism? Is there a tradition of civic humanism in Sweden 
that is optimistic about world citizenship? It also occurs to me (and here I 
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come closer to your question of me) that citizenship is very much a Euro- 
pean concept. (If there are multiple concepts bound up with space-time is 
there commonality? This comparative question seems very important to me 
and one I raise but do not expect you to answer!) Education and subject- 
ification – producing citizens – seems very much to me also tied to place/ 
space and issue concerning national cultures. I wonder whether I can get 
you to speculate about the European trajectory of the concept and its place-
bounds and the extent to which this might affect questions of historical 
ontology (becoming) in the world-becoming sense. 
 
Maria Olson: Thanks for reminding me of the ever-actual notion that every 
word, thought and deed is always an act of in(ter)vention from somewhere, 
it is place-bound. This is often forgotten, I think, in the mistaken belief that 
the speaker or thinker herself is located in an assumed outside the scene of 
analyses. Or that she, with the words of Spivak, occupies the very center of 
the scene. In your question Sweden comes into question as a place in the 
notion that Swedish intellectuals tend to nurture an ambition of ‘bettering’ 
the world. If I allow myself to speculate on this spontaneously, as I haven’t 
really thought of this question before, I would say that if this is the case, it 
can be seen as part of concrete historical events in Sweden. 
I think that the very consolidation of Sweden as a nation-state and the 
imaginary of ‘Swedishness’ are intimately entwined with a particular notion 
of trans-national humanness that comes into being in socio-liberal registers. 
Taking on the history of the 1900s in Sweden it is marked out by a strong 
confidence in the art of social engineering. The Swedish confidence in 
social engineering was established in the 40s, and enforced in the 60s and 
70s by the time of the Swedish Prime Minister and Social democrat Olof 
Palme. To put it bluntly this belief denotes a whole-hearted belief in that 
the world can be a better place to live in if we arrange it well through 
reforms, hard work, and each and every one’s duty to serve our fellow men 
and society, together with deliberate socio-political principles and a robust 
political will. Classical speeches of Palme, materialized in the book Politics 
Is Willing, in 1964, reflect this conviction. The confidence in social en- 
gineering is linked to a certain creed; that of internationalism. This creed 
involves helping your fellow men wherever they were located, and regard- 
less of what circumstances they live under. 
The social engineering, together with the creed of internationalism, was 
part of a more ample Social democrat nation-building project known as the 
‘Swedish model’, or ‘the Swedish Folkhome’. The model was established in 
the early 1900s when religion – Christianity, more specifically Protestantism 
– was played down as major unifying reference in Sweden. The process of 
secularization, together with urbanization and modernization, union move- 
ment, women’s movement, religious movement and other popular move- 
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ments, and also the fear of ending up in a situation like the German, gave 
rise to the formation of the Swedish welfare state. What is striking, in my 
point of view, is that this local national process, which was marked out by a 
striving for each and every one’s citizen rights in Marshallian registers, 
enclosed in itself the seed to its own excess: it built on the notion of an a-
territorial, placeless civic humanism where Swedish people were to reach 
out a helping hand to people in need of it no matter if these people wanted 
it or not. 
If we return to your question about a feasible Swedish civic humanism 
and the Swedish desire to produce conditions for a ‘better world’ I think 
that its relevance could be traced back to this historically settled process. 
“Swedishness”, the scent of the modern ‘we’ of Sweden as a nation-state, 
becomes actualized in tandem with the strong belief in social engineering 
and with the creed of nation-transcending gestures of applied civic humanity 
on an ‘needing world’. Out of this twofold actualization of Swedishness, of 
a Swedish ‘we’, which involves a strong belief in planning and in tran- 
scendence of national geographical borders, Sweden comes into being as a 
nation-state, and – at the same time – becomes an example of its own scent, 
of Swedishness. I think that this could be one way of answering your ques- 
tion of an assumedly Swedish civic humanism that aims at bettering the 
world. The well-planned reaching-out-a-hand to people who are in need of 
it not only feeds back on local national processes of internal ‘we’-enactment. 
It also claims the function of setting an example to the world. And in this 
sense, it could indeed be considered as a matter of Swedish cosmopolitanism.  
 
Michael Peters: This is a great response that attends to the historical 
contours of humanism and relates it to the Swedish context and you are 
right in my view in calling out the relationship of place/space to inter- 
subjectivity and nationality and identity as subjects. The European context 
as such, while not a single culture and despite its diversity, does share the 
legacy of humanism or at least that is how I interpret the efforts at Euro- 
pean constitution, efforts that at the super state level seem to have avoided 
an overly Christian statement of European humanism (leaving room for 
Muslim states), and yet one in the current euro crisis that has also become 
quickly bureaucratized and driven by concerns of banks. It seems to me 
that Habermas and Derrida were far too quick to talk of “core” European 
values and that subjectivities—and cosmopolitan ones included—are at the 
mercy of politicians, bureaucrats and bankers. No longer market and society 
but a market society that dictates, determines and regulates new juridical 
conceptions that define the ground for highlighting one form of European 
humanism at the expense of others: no longer a social rights-based view but 
one based on being a consumer-citizen or even investment-citizen increasingly 
forced to provide for their own health, education, employment in an ever 
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privatized world. This seems to me a problematic historical shift that de- 
cidedly moves away from the European social model much more to a fully 
privatized society where property rights are paramount. The consequences 
of education seem enormous. I guess these remarks are differently true for 
parts on the Mediterranean as opposed to Scandinavia, Germany or Great 
Britain. I am also aware that European humanism has been given very 
different treatments by Descartes, Marx and Heidegger who revealed its 
ideologies so completely. One wonders how seriously we can take the Con- 
stitution’s statement of fundamental human rights. Would you care to com- 
ment? 
 
Maria Olson: I think that you link up beautifully to the present situation in 
Europe in turning to the historicity of humanism involved in concrete 
events that have taken, and still take place in relation to the very idea of 
Europe. In doing so, the current situation of Europe can be depicted in terms 
of an historically unique stress on economical measures that seem to have 
converted into a matter of legacy. This legacy, which is laid down in con- 
stitutional law, tends to both allude to ‘old times’ of national values and to 
a need for private investments of different kinds. This situation, as you say, 
calls for a civic living that is in accordance with not only with market 
society but also with a special kind of liberal humanism that is to deal with 
a societal situation marked out by plurality. Out of this scenery it is hard, I 
think, to imagine a Europe that nurtures any ‘core values’ outside its own 
targets of privatization of society and increased stress on ‘old European 
values’. Its advanced level of bureaucratization, often materialized and per- 
formed as a general claim for the strengthening of human rights, undeniably 
gives birth to alienation. 
 With Mouffe this alienation can be articulated in terms of a harsh ex- 
pulsion of feelings and passions that are being nurtured by the popular and 
enacted by different popular movements. At the same time, ironically, this 
alienation seems to be fuelled by ‘another’ popular, i.e. by popular move- 
ments of which xenophobia and oppression of certain peoples are part of 
the program. Lobbying groups of right-wing political movements, like the 
ones that we see in the for example the Netherlands, France and Denmark, 
are vital examples of this fuelling. The question I want to put forth in 
stressing that Europe and ‘the European’ is ambivalent in its relationship to 
ordinary people – to the popular and to popular movements – is what this 
ambivalence might stand for. This question attunes to your remark, Michael, 
about the inherent expansive pretention of European humanism to cross 
borders and boundaries into a robust pluralist cosmopolitan citizenship. My 
own idea about this question is that it stands for fear. And the citizen-sub- 
ject that comes into being in the ‘juridified’ body of humanism in today’s 
Europe is a subject that testifies to this fear. This fear seems to be one that 
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itself fuels the ongoing juridical constitution of human rights, and further 
the body of European humanism in juridical and constitutional registers so 
that the process resembles a situation of Catch-22. Hence, the more urging 
the need for safety and security in the European society, the more juridical 
and constitutional orders are called upon. But this might take too far away 
from the theme at stake.  
 Alluding to the historical shift of Europe that you so adequately bring 
up – where advanced privatization, consumption and investments are key, 
and in which human rights are stressed as being almost spirited – I would 
like to raise another question in relation to this shift that is related to religion. 
More precisely to Christianity. I would like to challenge the notion that 
European Protestant Christianity has lost its historical powers (in favor of 
humanism) in the current, legally driven modern constitution of ‘the human’ 
in Europe. A constitution that be traced back to the events like the French 
Revolution. Could we picture this shift in Europe, with its principled notions 
of democracy and investment-centered ethos, as being ‘cracked’ in the sense 
that it lacks motivational forces? That is, as being part of cosmo-political 
era that no longer involves any ethico-political chronicled body needed for 
nurturing a citizenship held by inner motivation and spirit. That is, a citi- 
zenship that, with Critchley, is externally binding but not internally com- 
pelling. Referring to the feasible presence of Christianity in this situation it 
might reside in representing a somewhat attractive but at the same time 
impossible position for European (liberal) humanism; it cannot be turned 
to, as it – which Linda Woodhead has described convincingly – represents 
everything that stands for non-illumination, pre-modernity and non-progress 
in society. At the same time it is appealing as it denotes the inner moti- 
vational force that tends to be missing in European cosmopolitan humanist 
citizenship, if we are to believe the current political worries about decre- 
asing levels of participation among youth. 
 Could this shift of Europe be seen as part of an indirect craving for a 
religiously laden utopia that no longer exists? Or, to turn the argument 
inside out, could the increasing claims for tolerance and stress on consumer- 
ism and the importance of respecting human rights be considered as an 
outcome of a discreet Christianity that has come to flourish in these ways? 
A flourishing that invites for speculation about whether, with Caputo ‘the 
dead of the death of God’ is actualized anew in other ways, in an almost 
spirited belief in juridical and economical forces than was the case back in 
the days of hegemonic Christendom. If we take on the idea that today’s 
Europe is fuelled by popular fear of global threats such as claimed terror-
deeds and in need for safety and security, we might ask ourselves if we are 
facing a situation in Europe in which the formula of being and becoming 
human is assumed to be secularized but the spirit of the process is not? 
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Michael Peters: This is an interesting reflection because you remind me 
that the notion of rights is deeply tied to Christian culture and grew out of 
it, at least some forms of equality that we now take for granted. This 
heritage and history cannot be forgotten or wished away no matter how 
much the constitutional planners want to make room for other religions and 
cultures. Religious toleration was also fundamental to Europe and laws were 
passed that permitted religious freedoms even though these were not always 
observed. The treatment of strangers—a major theme of cosmopolitanism 
—was advocated in books of the Old Testament: sermons for the toleration 
of those different from us and less powerful. Various tolerances were issued 
by the Catholic Church not to discriminate against Jews, and by Islamic 
rulers in Spain to accept Christians and to allow them the freedom to prac- 
tice their religion. The emergence of forms of tolerance also was central to 
the emergence of Protestantism and liberalism as a political ideology. These 
tolerances were, as you point out, legally sanctioned and juridified. Tolerance 
is certainly a fundamental principle of liberalism that assumes a neutral state 
and its defense can be found in Locke, Mill, Hart, and Rawls. Yet there are 
limits to tolerance (and therefore limits to cosmopolitanism). I am thinking 
of the historic shift after the end of the Cold War to multiculturalism start- 
ing in the 1960s and perhaps coming to an end in Europe in the last few 
years. I recently issued a call for papers for Policy Futures in Education with 
this description: 
 
Multiculturalism has been the dominant paradigm for the West 
since the 1960s influencing a range of policies from international 
development, immigration to democracy promotion. Over the 
decade or so since 9/11 and against the background of the Iraq 
War, terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid and 
London, and a number of other critical incidents, Europe has 
officially turned away from the doctrine of state multiculturalism. 
In 2010 Angela Merkel declared that multiculturalism in Ger- 
many had ‘failed utterly’ and indicated that it was an illusion to 
think that German and ‘gastarbeiters’ or guest workers could 
live happily together. Merkel’s stance was repeated by Nicolas 
Sarkozy in 2011 who commented that ‘We have been too con- 
cerned about the identity of the person who was arriving and not 
enough about the identity of the country that was receiving him.’ 
Merkel’s and Sarkozy’s comments were quickly supported by 
former prime ministers for Australia and for Spain John Howard 
and Jose Maria Aznar. On 5th February 2011, the British Prime 
Minister David Cameron1 echoed the criticisms of state multi- 
culturalism arguing ‘Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, 
we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, 
apart from each other and the mainstream. We have failed to 
provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to 
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belong. We have even tolerated these segregated communities 
behaving in ways that run counter to our values.’ Cameron’s talk 
was aimed at Islamic extremism and the process of radicalization 
while being careful not to lump all Muslims together. He too 
focused on the need for identity with core liberal values of host 
societies: ‘we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent 
years and a much more active, muscular liberalism.’ Partly as a 
response, in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, there emerged a 
call for ‘integration’ and for a ‘community cohesion agenda’ 
comprised of tougher immigration and deportment laws, citizen- 
ship tests, compulsory citizenship education, and new employ- 
ment policies giving preference to British workers. The com- 
bined impact of the Iraq war, the Abu-Ghraib and Guantánamo 
Bay abuses and the ‘war on terror’ have been highly damaging 
to Muslim minorities leading to claims of social exclusion, dis- 
crimination and abrogation of identity rights. At the same time 
political Islam is in a state of radical transformation with the 
events of the Arab Spring and a space of revolutionary protests 
in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen that have forced traditional 
rulers from power with other protests throughout the Arab world. 
This special issue investigates the end of European multicul- 
turalism against this contemporary political backdrop. 
 
I wonder what you response is to this situation? How is Sweden responding 
to terrorism and to declarations on the end of multiculturalism? I would 
really like to publish your work in response to this theme. I see this policy 
shift as working against the old notion of tolerance based on cordial treat- 
ment of the stranger, an ancient notion that motivates cosmopolitan con- 
ceptions by scholars like Levinas, Kristeva and Derrida. In the current 
environment, is this any way that policy makers can square these notions? 
 
Maria Olson: These are indeed important questions that you pull forth. 
Leaving your question about Sweden aside, I want to try out some general 
points of a possible end of European multiculturalism. This idea can be 
given rise to, I think, in terms of an increasingly bewildered notion of the 
concept of Utopia. The semantic meaning of the Greek work Utopia denotes 
‘the place that is not’. But for centuries, which postcolonial thinkers have 
offered insights into, Europe has come to house Utopia; it has come to both 
embody and to populate it. As we touched upon earlier in our conversation, 
this housing of Utopia has taken manifold directions historically, involving 
both Christian and secular scopes where cosmopolitan notions of tolerance 
are a vibrant part. Taking on this European housing of Utopia, we could ask 
to what the current cries for a “more active and muscular” liberalism among 
European political leaders respond? Could it be that Europe has come to a 
point where it is no longer clear that the European housing of Utopia will 
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go on in the future? Or are we just witnessing a repetitious process where 
Europe and the idea of the European anew, and at the same time differently, 
seeks another way to house – perhaps an all-encompassing, multicultural – 
Utopia? Alluding to your call for papers we may ask what beginnings that 
the end of European multiculturalism offer to us? The overwhelming silence 
on the ‘war on terror’ and the Arab Spring in Europe as well as in Sweden 
is calling us to take these questions seriously. Keeping in mind that phi- 
losophy, as Nietzsche states, does not exist to make us better human beings, 
but too make us more thoughtful ones. 
 
Michael Peters: Thank you for such a thoughtful response especially in 
regard to the Swedish scene. One last question and this time about the 
direction of your own work and your future projects. Can you say some- 
thing about the trajectory of your research and where it leads you? 
 
Maria Olson: Taking on my interest in educational theory and philosophy 
I wish to continue a line of research in which attention is drawn to col- 
lective processes of subjectification and other educational outcomes that are 
intimately related to current events and processes in society. To date this 
research course has involved different critical and constructive perspectives 
on democracy, education and citizenship that draw on different post struc- 
tural thinkers. In continuing this line of research my ambition is to strength- 
en and contribute to further development of an educational research that 
aligns philosophical thinking with contemporary global social, political and 
cultural changes in the world. 
 
NOTE 
 
    1. See http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pmsspeech-at-munich-security-conference/ 
Copyright of Contemporary Readings in Law & Social Justice is the property of Addleton
Academic Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted
to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may
print, download, or email articles for individual use.
